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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Since fiscal 2003, the 'performance' of the Japanese banking sector, in terms of 
profitability, asset quality, and capital adequacy, has improved markedly as the real 
economy has recovered, suggesting that the widespread pessimism (see, for example, Hall, 
2006 and IMF, 2003) expressed earlier concerning the fragility of the sector was 
somewhat overdone. Yet, despite these positive developments, a number of serious 
challenges still face the Japanese banking industry and their supervisors. Core 
profitability, for example, remains very weak, in part due to wafer thin lending margins at 
home and sluggish corporate loan demand. Asset quality has also widely suffered because 
of exposure to the re-regulated consumer finance industry and the US sub-prime market. 
And controversy still surrounds the issues of bank "under-reserving" and regulatory 
tolerance of "double gearing" on the capital adequacy front. These, and other, problems 
must be resolved if Japanese banks are to finally re-claim the ground lost to international 
competitors over the last 15 years or so and secure lasting improvement in their financial 
health. 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL Classification:  G21; G28; G32. 
Keywords:  Japanese Banking; Performance  Capital Adequacy and Profitability; 
Supervision; Financial Stability. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Apart from turning the tide on the non-performing loan (NPL) front, most performance 
indicators at the end of fiscal 2002 (i.e. at end-March 2003) painted a fairly bleak portrait 
of the Japanese banking sector. Return on assets and on equity were negative; core and net 
capital were in steady decline, with deferred tax assets (DTAs) assuming a growing share 
of core capital; and the sector was heavily exposed to equity risk, credit risk and interest 
rate risk (IMF, 2003; Hall, 2006). At end-March 2004, however, five of the top seven 
banking groups (UFJ Holdings and Resona Holdings  Resona Bank had to be rescued by 
the Government in May 2003  were the odd ones out) posted net profits for the first time 
in three years, with the sector returning to overall profitability in fiscal 2004. And the 
following year, record profits were recorded by the banking industry. This remarkable 
turnaround, together with the associated reduction in financial fragility, are analysed in 
more detail below, together with the formidable problems still besetting the sector. 
 
 The paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the structure of the 
Japanese banking sector as it stood at end-March 2007 following further consolidation and 
rationalisation. Section 3 analyses the latest trends in bank 'performance', in terms of 
profitability, asset quality and capital adequacy. Section 4 looks at the challenges still 
facing the sector. And Section 5 summarises and concludes. 
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2. THE STRUCTURE OF THE JAPANESE DEPOSIT-TAKING SECTOR 
 
 
 
As shown on Exhibit 1, at end-March 2007 there were over 200 banks proper operating in 
Japan with more than 1,500 cooperative-type institutions also active as deposit-takers. The 
former group comprised 6 City Banks, 64 Regional Banks, 46 Second Association 
Regional Banks, 65 Foreign Banks, 21 Trust Banks and 10 'others'. Continued 
consolidation amongst the major banks has meant that 4 major banking groups  
Mitsubishi UFJ, Mizuho, Sumitomo Mitsui and Resona  now dominate the banking scene 
in Japan (see Exhibit 2), with the 'Long-Term Credit Bank' categorisation finally 
disappearing as a separate sub-group. [For a discussion of the operations performed by the 
various categories of bank and co-operative see Japanese Bankers' Association, 2001.] 
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3. RECENT TRENDS IN BANK PERFORMANCE 
 
 
 
3.1  Profitability 
 
As can be seen from Exhibit 3, the banking industry's performance was dire between fiscal 
1995 and 2002, largely as a result of the collapse of Japan's asset price bubble and 
stagnation in the real economy. Indeed, during this period, net losses were recorded for 
each of the years 1995, 1997, 1998, 2001 and 2002. Whilst lending margins and gross  
profits remained fairly stable, net operating profits were negative from fiscal 1993 
onwards because of the impact of disposing of huge amounts of NPLs on "loan losses". 
The fall in the value of securities held and the introduction of mark-to-market accounting 
also meant that, after fiscal 2001, banks were unable to boost profits by realising capital 
gains. 
 
 With the pick-up in the real economy (albeit at a sluggish pace) from 2003, largely due 
to export-led recovery because of a low exchange rate, and knock-on effects for corporate 
Japan and the stock market, the banking sector's fortunes began to improve. Although the 
sector, overall, did not return to profitability until fiscal 2004,i with the major banks 
reporting positive net income for the first time in 4 years and the regional banks for the 
first time in 10 years, 5 of the top 7 banking groups had, in fact, reported net profits in 
fiscal 2003, as noted in the introduction. Continued economic recovery during 2004/05,ii a 
return to positive bank lendingiii and cessation of deflationiv contributed to a record profits 
performance by the sector in fiscal 2005 as loan losses fell dramatically and a recovery in 
stock prices allowed for the realisation of capital gains again. Fiscal 2006 saw the industry 
reporting very healthy,v if slightly lower  because of a slight decrease in interest margins, 
a fall in non-interest income and an increase in credit costs associated with exposures to 
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the consumer finance industry as a result of changes in the law relating to the so-called 
usurious (although the legal maximum was retrospectively cut to 29.2 per cent, borrowers 
were seeking refunds on loans charging over 20 per cent) 'grey zone loans' (see Bank of 
Japan, 2007, for a more detailed analysis  profits. But, in fiscal 2007, sharply lower 
profits were reported due mainly to the continuing impact of exposures to the consumer 
finance industry (i.e. loans to and investments in consumer finance companies, consumer 
credit companies and credit card companies) and, for some, to the US sub-prime marketvi 
(see Bank of Japan, 2008). 
 
3.2  Asset Quality 
The trend in the Japanese deposit-taking sector's "bad" (i.e. "risk management") loans is 
clearly indicated in Exhibit 4. Hitting a peak of ¥53 trillion at end-March 2002, it was 
down to ¥18.4. trillion by end-March 2007. In part, this reflects the success of the FSA's 
plan to force the major banks to halve their NPL ratios between end-March 2002, when 
the combined ratio stood at 8.4 per cent, and end-March 2005. As demonstrated in Exhibit 
5, the major banks' combined ratio was down to 2.9 per cent by end-March 2005, with 
further declines taking it down to 1.5 per cent by end-March 2007, a level maintained at 
end-September 2007, the latest date for which figures are available (FSA, 2008). At 3.9 
per cent, the latest figure for the regional bank grouping also represents a substantial 
improvement on the recent past (it was 7.8 per cent at end-March 2003, for example), 
although some regional banks are still operating with ratios substantially in excess of this 
figure. The performance during fiscal 2007, however  as noted above  is likely to 
reverse this declining trend somewhat, but hopefully only temporarily.  
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3.3  Capital Adequacy 
 
Despite all groups of banks posting figures demonstrating compliance with capital 
adequacy requirements, be they of the risk-adjusted type applied to internationally-active 
banks under the risk assets ratio (minimum 8 per cent) methodology of the Basel Accord 
or of the type applied to domestic-only operators (where a 4 per cent minimum ratio 
applies), this apparently happy state of affairs masked serious problems during the post-
bubble era. As shown in Exhibit 6: core capital was in steady decline between 1995 and 
1998 and again between 2001 and 2003, reflecting the decline in the banks' profitability 
and the inability to issue common stock, at a reasonable price, because of the declining 
value of a bank franchise; net capital (i.e. after allowing for post-tax revaluation gains on 
securities held) was likewise in steady decline between 1994 and 1998 and again between 
2000 and 2003, reflecting gyrations in the value of their securities; after 1998, DTAs 
represented a significant proportion of net capital; and, following capital injections by the 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC) towards the end of the century in an attempt to 
stabilise the banking and financial sectors (see Hall, 2006), from 1999 a significant chunk 
of core equity capital was held by the Government reflecting the degree of 'nationalisation' 
instituted by the authorities. Since 2003, however, these problems have become less 
important. The recovery in bank profitability has put core and net capital on an upward 
trend since 2003. DTAs as a proportion of capital are now much less significant.vii And the 
proportion of privately-held net capital has increased since 2003 as banks have repaid 
some of the earlier DIC capital injections.viii 
 
 Notwithstanding these undoubted improvements in both the quality and quantityix of 
bank capital at a time when exposures to credit risk, interest rate risk and market risk 
(incurred through stock holdings) were also generally fallingx - thereby reducing overall 
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financial fragility  some questions remain about the capital adequacy assessment regime. 
These are addressed in the next section. 
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4. CHALLENGES STILL FACING THE JAPANESE BANKING SECTOR 
 
 
 
4.1  Profitability 
 
Despite the recent improvements in profitability noted in section 3.1, which saw major 
banks achieving a return on equity (ROE) of 16 per cent in fiscal 2005 - almost on a par 
with major US/EU banks - compared with a figure of over 7 per cent posted by regional 
banks, this has resulted mainly from the sharp reduction in credit costs enjoyed as a result 
of the reduced need to make allowance for loan losses once the NPL problem came under 
control. This has led economists at the Bank of Japan to develop a profitability measure 
that excludes volatile factors, such as credit costs, gains/losses on securities and corporate 
income tax payments. Their preferred measure (see Hattori et al., 2007), is "core ROE", 
where the above-mentioned volatile items are stripped out of ROE, defined as net income 
as a proportion of common stock plus preferred stock. Using this measure of profitability, 
the major banks as a group (there is large discrepancy between individual banks) are 
shown to have secured only a slight increase  from 0.7 per cent to 1.7 per cent  in 
profitability between fiscal 2003 and fiscal 2005, with the regional banks failing to show 
any improvement! For the major banks, the limited increase in core ROE was due to net 
income increasing by only fractionally more than equity. This, in turn, was mainly due to a 
fall in net interest income (the fall in interest income from loans exceeding the rise from 
securities) offsetting, to a degree, the increase enjoyed in non-interest income (e.g. from 
fees and commissions). The regional banks somewhat poorer performance reflected their 
slower growth in non-interest income for, whereas both groups of banks enjoyed increased 
fee income from the sale of mutual funds and pension/insurance policies, the major banks 
also enjoyed significant contributions from the origination of syndicated loans and the 
provision of commitment lines. 
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 The above analysis highlights the main factors still adversely impacting on bank 
profitability. For, although positive ROAs and ROEs are once again the norm, core ROEs 
are very low, both in absolute terms and relative to EU/G10 banks (see Bank of Japan, 
2007, pp.47-50), because of weak growth in interest income  due to anaemic corporate 
loan demand and an inability to expand lending margins in a low nominal interest rate and 
highly competitive environment  and, for many, limited success in diversifying away 
from traditional lending activities.xi Moreover, attempts to raise investment returns by 
diversifying away from stocks and bondsxii (e.g. into structured products  such as RMBs, 
including those originated in Japan  credit products and hedge funds) have been shown to 
be fraught with danger; witness the fallout from the sub-prime turmoil discussed earlier. 
  
 In the face of such difficulties, banks will need to try and boost profits earnt on their 
core business by improving their management of credit risk,xiii restraining the increase in 
credit costs, raising lending margins and re-enforcing their fee-generating business 
(Hattori et al., 2007). Whilst the last two remedies will not prove easy in the current 
market environment,xiv especially for regional banks given the major banks incursion into 
their traditional territory and the growing importance of the Japan Post Bank, the Post 
Office's new banking arm,xv they are essential components of an integrated strategy that 
should seek to identify comparative advantage and market demands and then deliver the 
chosen services in the most cost-effective way possible. For some, this may necessitate 
structural re-organisation to enable group capital to be used more efficiently (Bank of 
Japan, 2007). Whatever strategies are adopted, management expertise will be at a premium 
in the brave new world. 
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 From a policy perspective, the imperatives are to nurture the recovery in the real 
economy, to try to engineer a generalised recovery in land prices and to promote the 
efficiency and competitiveness of the Japanese banking sector through deregulation.xvi 
Further rationalisation within the regional bank sector should also be encouraged as some 
highly inefficient operators still exist, protected by the monopolistic practices still evident 
within the prefectural system. 
 
4.2  Asset Quality 
While the recent decline in NPL ratios, for both the major bank grouping and (most of) the 
regionals, towards international norms is to be applauded, the losses incurred on exposures 
to the consumer finance industry and on sub-prime-related products are a reminder of how 
quickly events can change. Risk management skills and policies must be up-rated if future 
losses on loans and investments are to be held to acceptable levels. 
 
4.3  Capital Adequacy 
Notwithstanding the recent increases achieved in both the quantity and quality of bank 
capital noted in section 3.3 above, a number of reservations remain concerning the 
capitalisation of Japanese banks. With respect to compliance with the BIS "rules", a 
stricter interpretation would see: some of the banks' loan loss provisions, currently 
classified as general but which, in reality, are specific, being fully deducted from capital; a 
greater proportion of cross-shareholdings being deducted from capital (to overcome the 
problem of "double gearing"); and further restrictions being placed on the inclusion of 
DTAs in core capital. Moreover, a more realistic view needs to be taken by some banks of 
the value of loan collateral and borrowers' capacity to repay, as reflected in NPL 
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classifications and hence provisioning,xvii a move which would further deplete reported 
bank capital ratios. 
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5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
Since fiscal 2003, the 'performance' of the Japanese banking sector has improved 
markedly, in tandem with that of the real economy. Record profits were revealed in fiscal 
2005, with results for fiscal 2006 showing only a small fall from this peak, although 
results for fiscal 2007 were disappointing. Similarly, asset quality has generally improved, 
with non-performing loan (NPL) ratios now well below the historic highs recorded at end-
March 2002, and market risks now somewhat lower than when the IMF conducted its 
infamous 'Financial Stability Assessment Programme' stress tests back in 2003. Moreover, 
bank capital adequacy has generally improved, with both 'Tier 1' ratios and overall, BIS 
risk-adjusted ratios (now Basel II compliant) typically approaching international norms 
and being comfortably in excess of regulatory requirements. And the quality of capital has 
also increased with less reliance now being placed on deferred tax assets as a source of 
capital. 
 
 Yet things are not as healthy as this image portrays. Core profitability, once volatile 
factors such as credit costs are stripped from the figures, remains very weak, both in 
absolute terms and relative to EU/G10 averages. Lending margins remain wafer thin. Loan 
demand, most especially from corporates, is still sluggish. Land prices have yet to see a 
generalised recovery. And diversification from traditional lending activities is still limited, 
fee and commission income at the major banks, for example, accounting for around only 
20 per cent of operating income. Similarly, with respect to asset quality, exposures to the 
US sub-prime market have delivered investment losses for some whilst exposures to the 
consumer finance industry since the passage of legislation concerning usurious "grey 
loans" have caused nasty blips in both NPL ratios and credit costs. Moreover, the issues 
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surrounding continued "under-reserving" and regulatory tolerance of "double gearing" 
mitigate, to a degree, the successes achieved on the capital adequacy front. Overall, 
however, the Japanese banking sector appears to be firmly "back on track", following its 
abysmal performance during the "lost decade", now boasting some of the largest banks (by 
assets size) in the world, if not yet by return on equity! The continuing challenges faced in 
intensely competitive domestic and international markets are, however, well understood. 
And rising nominal interest rates along with improved risk management capabilities are 
likely to deliver increasing benefits in the medium to long term. 
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Endnotes 
 
                                                
i  Although Exhibit 3 actually shows the sector returning to profitability in fiscal 2003 because of a 
difference in coverage of institutions. 
ii  Real GDP grew by 2.8 per cent in 2005 and has remained positive since 2003. 
iii  Bank lending rose, for the first time in seven years, in August 2005. 
iv  The Core Consumer Price Index, which excludes perishable foods but includes fuel costs, returned to a 
positive level in November 2005, rising by 0.5 per cent in the 12 months to end-March 2006. By end-
March 2008, the index had reached a 10-year high of 1.2 per cent due to rising food and energy prices 
but, stripping these items out, left a figure of only 0.1 per cent (and the GDP deflator was still minus 1 
per cent). 
v  Assisted by the removal of the competitive advantages enjoyed by the Postal Savings System and Postal 
Life-Insurance through privatisation, and by the privatisation/scaling back of the operations of other 
government-sponsored financial institutions (Fukao, 2007). 
vi  At the end of January 2008, the major banks reported net losses on sub-prime-related products for the 
first nine months of fiscal 2007 of ¥600 billion, with the big three groups  Mizuho, MUFJ and SMFG  
reporting net losses of ¥345 billion, ¥55 billion and ¥99 billion respectively. In May 2008, however, 
when the full year's figures were released, the major banks' combined losses on such products were 
revealed to be ¥863 billion, with Mizuho, MUFJ and SMFG recording losses of ¥645 billion, ¥125 
billion and ¥93 billion respectively. For Mizuho and MUFG, these losses contributed to recorded falls in 
net profits for fiscal 2007 of 49.8 per cent and 27.7 per cent respectively. SMFG, however, managed to 
marginally boost full year net profits, by 4.6 per cent; whilst the Resona Group, despite steering clear of 
sub-prime problems, still suffered a 55 per cent fall in net profits. For Mizuho, the bulk of whose sub-
prime trades were booked through its brokerage office in London, the sub-prime-related losses resulted 
in the bank recording its first quarterly loss for five years. 
vii  Due, in part, to the introduction of a limit in March 2006  40 per cent of BIS core capital. This limit was 
then reduced to 20 per cent in March 2008. 
viii  By end-June 2007, ¥8.8 trillion of the near ¥12 trillion of capital injections had been repaid by the 
banking sector, the three mega banking groups having already fully repaid during fiscal 2006. 
ix  The transition to a Basel II basis of assessment for internationally-active banks had little impact on 
reported ratios, although it did reduce risk-weighted assets for some (Bank of Japan, 2007). Most of the 
major banks adopted the foundation IRB approach, duly reporting overall risk-adjusted ratios of 12 per 
cent plus at end-March 2007, with Tier 1 ratios in excess of 7 per cent. [The corresponding figures for 
regional banks were 10 per cent and 8 per cent respectively.] 
x  The 'infamous' stress tests conducted by the IMF in 2002 and 2003 (see IMF, 2003) showed how 
seriously exposed the sector at that time was to equity risk, interest rate risk and credit risk, especially if 
DTAs are stripped out of shareholders' equity. 
xi  For the major bank grouping, fee and commission income represented only 20 per cent of operating 
income in fiscal 2006, with income from trading (e.g. forex and derivatives) and other sources amounting 
to 5 per cent and 27 per cent of total operating income respectively. This meant that the group's reliance 
on interest income (from loans and securities investments) had shrunk between fiscal 2002 and fiscal 
2006 as its share of total operating income fell from 57 per cent to 49 per cent. 
   As far as lending activities are concerned, in the face of weak demand from their traditional customers 
 large corporates  the banks have diversified into M&A and real estate financing, and the provision of 
housing loans to individuals and loans to SMEs. Moreover, some have returned to overseas markets in 
the quest for greater returns, with MUFG and SMFG seeking increased exposure through strategic 
investments in Merrill Lynch (MUFG has a $1.2 billion stake) and Vietnam's Export-Import Commercial 
Joint Stock Bank (SMFG has a 15 per cent stake) respectively. 
xii  'Alternative investments' accounted for nearly 10 per cent of the total balance of 'securities and monetary 
claims bought' for the major banks at end-September 2007, with the regional's share standing at 7 per 
cent. 
xiii  Through, for example, using more sophisticated credit-scoring techniques and portfolio credit risk 
models, making use of credit bureaus and adopting an integrated risk management approach. 
xiv  Although a rise in market interest rates  policy rates are still at 0.5 per cent  would produce an adverse 
impact on bank profitability in the short run, because of the induced decline in the market value of bond 
portfolios, in the medium term it is likely to improve bank profitability by raising net interest margins, 
especially for the major banks. 
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xv  It has over ¥189,000 billion in deposits and a network of 24,000 branches, making it the world's largest 
bank on both counts. 
xvi  Introduction of the so-called "Second Big Bang" set of reforms (see FSA, 2007), embracing, amongst 
other things, proposals to lower the firewalls between banking and broking, is currently being held up 
because of a hung Parliament, with little legislative action now envisaged until January 2008 at the 
earliest. 
xvii  See Fukao, 2007 (Table 6) for an estimate of "under-reserving" during the fiscal 1997 to fiscal 2005 
period (e.g. at end-March 2006, estimated under-reserving amounted to ¥8.3 trillion compared with a 
private net (core) capital account balance of  ¥21.5 trillion). 
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EXHIBIT 1 : CATEGORISATION OF PRIVATE DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS  
    OPERATING IN JAPAN* 
 
 
          
                  
 
Banks1  - City Banks (6)       
   - Regional Banks (64)      
   - Second Association of Regional 
 Banks (46)        
   - Foreign Banks (65)        
   - Trust Banks (21)2          
   - Others (10)3         
 
Cooperatives - Shinkin Central Bank      
   - Shinkin Banks (287)     
 
   - Shinkumi Federation Bank    
 - Credit Cooperatives (168)    
 
   - Rokinren Bank     
   - Labor Banks (13)      
 
   - Norinchukin Bank      
 
   - Credit Federation of Agricultural   
 Cooperatives (41)     
   - Agricultural Cooperatives (835)   
 
   - Credit Federations of Fishery    
   Cooperatives (31)     
   - Fishery Cooperatives (181)    
 
 
 
 
* Figures in parentheses represent the number of institutions in each category operating at 1 April 2007. 
 
Notes: (1) Including 10 bank holding companies. 
  (2) Including foreign-owned trust banks. 
  (3) Including the Second Bridge Bank of Japan and the Resolution and Collection Corporation. 
 
 
 
Source: Japanese Bankers' Association, 2007, p.1. 
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EXHIBIT 2 :  CONSOLIDATION AMONGST THE MAJOR JAPANESE BANKS, 
2000-2006 
 
 
Merged Entities Date of Merger New Entity Formed Latest Developments 
    
Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank(1) 
Fuji Bank(1) 
Industrial Bank of Japan(2) 
Mizuho Trust(3) 
(jointly owned) 
September 2000 Mizuho Holdings, 
comprising: 
Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank(1); 
Fuji Bank(1); 
Industrial Bank of Japan(2); 
Mizuho Trust(3) 
Mizuho Holdings (renamed 
Mizuho Financial Group in 
March 2003), 
comprising (at April 2002): 
Mizuho Bank(1); 
Mizuho Corporate Bank(1); 
Mizuho Trust(3) 
    
Sakura Bank(1) 
Sumitomo Bank(1) 
April 2001 Sumitomo Mitsui 
Banking Corporation 
Sumitomo Mitsui 
Financial Group, 
comprising (at Dec. 2002): 
Sumitomo Mitsui 
Banking Corporation(1) 
    
Bank of Tokyo 
Mitsubishi(1) 
- Tokyo Trust(3) 
Mitsubishi Trust(4) 
Nippon Trust(4) 
April 2001 Mitsubishi Tokyo 
Financial Group, 
comprising: 
Bank of Tokyo- 
Mitsubishi(1); 
Mitsubishi Trust(4); 
Nippon Trust(4); 
Tokyo Trust(3) 
Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial 
Group, 
comprising (at Oct. 2001): 
Bank of Tokyo-
Mitsubishi(1); 
Mitsubishi Trust(4) 
    
Sanwa Bank(1) 
Tokai Bank(1) 
- Tokai Trust(3) 
Toyo Trust(4) 
April 1001 UFJ Holdings, 
comprising: 
Sanwa Bank(1); 
Tokai Bank(1); 
Toyo Trust(4); 
Tokai Trust(3) 
 
UFJ Holdings, 
comprising (at Jan. 2002): 
UFJ Bank(1); 
UFJ Trust(4) 
 
    
Daiwa Bank Holdings, 
comprising (at Dec. 2001): 
Daiwa Bank(1); 
Kinki Osaka Bank(5);  
Nara Bank(5); 
Asahi Bank(1); 
Asahi Trust(3) 
March 2002 
(effective 
October 2002) 
 
Resona Holdings, 
comprising: 
Daiwa Bank(1); 
Asahi Bank(1); 
Kinki Osaka Bank(5); 
Nara Bank(5); 
Daiwa Trust(4) 
Resona Holdings, 
comprising (at March 
2003): 
Resona Bank(1); 
Saitama Resona Bank(1); 
Kinki Osaka Bank(5); 
Nara Bank(5); 
Resona Trust(4) 
 
    
Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial 
Group 
UFJ Holdings 
October 2005 
(effective 
January 2006) 
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial 
Group 
- 
 
Notes: (1) City Bank. [In 2004 the Saitama Resona Bank was reclassified as a regional bank.] 
  (2) Long-Term Credit Bank. 
  (3) Trust Bank Subsidiary.  
  (4) Trust Bank. 
  (5) Regional Bank. 
 
 
Source: Japanese Bankers' Association, 2006, p.14. 
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EXHIBIT 4 : THE EVOLUTION OF THE "BAD" (i.e. "RISK MANAGEMENT") 
LOANS OF THE JAPANESE DEPOSIT-TAKING SECTOR, 1992-
2006 
    
 
 
Date 
"Bad" Loans 
Outstanding 
(Y  billion) 
Stock of Specific 
Provisions Outstanding 
(Y  billion) 
Estimate of "Problem 
Loans to be Disposed of"1 
 (Y  billion) 
    
End of March 1992 7,000-8,0002 -- -- 
End of March 1993 8,4002 -- -- 
End of March 1994 10,5002 -- -- 
End of September 1994 13,3002 -- -- 
End of March 1995 11,6402 -- -- 
End of September 1995 38,0863 6,961 18,5874 
End of March 1996 34,7995,6 12,5305 8,3055 
End of September 1996 29,2287,8 9,9487 7,3037 
End of March 1997 27,9009,10 12,3439 4,6859 
End of September 1997 28,07811,12 13,99311 4,34811 
End of March 1998 
Under "old" disclosure 
Standards 
 
24,97913,14 
 
N.A. 
 
N.A. 
Under "new disclosure" 
Standards 
35,20713,14 19,03513 1,58313,15 
End of March 1999 38,656 14,802 N.A. 
End of March 2000 41,36716 11,50016 N.A. 
End of March 2001 43,44817 10,03917 N.A. 
End of March 2002 53,04918 10,37518 N.A. 
End of March 2003 45,67618 8,56918 N.A. 
End of March 2004 35,851 7,775 N.A. 
End of March 2005 25,840 6,384 N.A. 
End of March 2006 20,284 4,583 N.A. 
End of March 2007 18,354 4,297 N.A. 
 
 
Notes: 
1. This figure represents an estimate by the Ministry of Finance of the scale of loans for which possible 
losses have not been provided nor that are likely to be covered by collateral (i.e. loan losses considered 
"irrecoverable" and not provided for). 
2. Ministry of Finance estimate of "nonperforming loans" for the 21 largest banks. Figures include claims 
against customers who went bankrupt and claims on which interest payments were more than six 
months overdue due to the suspension of interest payments, but exclude "restructured loans" (i.e. those 
on which interest payments have been cut) and the bad debts of affiliates. 
3. Figures include "restructured loans" (i.e. loans on which interest rates have been reduced to below the 
ruling official discount rate) for the first time and now cover all Japanese deposit-taking financial 
institutions (i.e. city banks, long-term credit banks, trust banks, regional banks and co-operatives). 
4. The figure is inclusive of possible losses (estimated at Y 7,700 billion) resulting from exposure to the 
eight jusen companies. 
5. The figures exclude the Kizu Cooperative (with about Y 1,190 billion in problem loans), the Fukui 
Prefecture First Credit Cooperative (Y 2.6 billion), the Osaka Credit Cooperative (Y 270 billion), and 
Taiheiyo Bank (Y 330 billion). 
6. The figure excludes loans to borrowers to which the lending bank(s) is extending help (including 
forgiving loans), estimated at Y 3,795 billion for all "major" banks (i.e. excluding regional banks and 
co-operatives) at end of March 1996. 
7. Loans to jusen companies are excluded, as are the Kizu Credit Cooperative (with approximately Y 1,190 
billion in problem loans), the Osaka Credit Cooperative (Y 270 billion), the Kenmindaiwa Credit 
Cooperative (Y 15 billion), and Sanyo Credit Cooperatives (Y 17 billion). 
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8. The figure excludes loans to borrowers to which the lending bank is extending help (including forgiving 
loans), estimated at Y 3,724 billion for all "major" banks (i.e. excluding regional banks and co-
operatives) at end of September 1996. 
9. The figures exclude the Hanwa Bank (with around Y 190 billion in problem loans), the Sanpuku Credit 
Cooperative (Y 26 billion), and the Hanshin Labor Credit Cooperative (Y 3.5 billion). 
10. The figure excludes loans to borrowers to which the lending bank(s) is extending help (including 
forgiving loans), estimated at Y 3,373 billion at end of March 1997 for all "major" banks (i.e. excluding 
co-operatives but including regional banks for the first time). 
11. The figures exclude the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, Hanwa Bank, Hanshin Labor Credit Cooperative, 
Tokai Credit Cooperative, Toki Credit Cooperative, Kitakyushu Credit Cooperative, Kanagawa Credit 
Cooperative, Tanabe Credit Cooperative, and the Choginosaka Credit Cooperative. 
12. The figure excludes loans to borrowers to which the lending bank(s) is extending help, estimated at 
Y 3,084 billion at end of September 1997 for all major banks (as defined in note 10). 
13. The figures exclude the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, Tokuyo City Bank, Kyoto Kyoei Bank, Naniwa 
Bank, Fukutoku Bank, Midori Bank, and 32 credit companies whose assets and liabilities have been 
transferred to other institutions. 
14. The figure excludes loans to borrowers to which the lending bank(s) is extending help, estimated at 
Y 2,015 billion at end of March 1998 for all Japanese deposit-taking institutions. 
15. The figure was provided privately to me by the FSA. 
16. The figures exclude the Nippon Credit Bank. 
17. The figures include the Nippon Credit Bank but exclude the Tokyo Sowa Bank, Niigata Chuo Bank and 
bankrupted co-operatives. 
18. The figures exclude financial institutions which were declared bankrupt. 
 
 
 
Sources: Hall, 2000; Financial Supervisory/Services Agency (various). 
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